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No. 6298

In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
THO~I...-\.S

E. LUDLOvV, EARL LUDLO\Y, Other,vise Kno"rn as T. E.
Ludlow, EDW~lRD B. SELENE,
Rl'"Fl'"S .A.XDERSO·N, MARGARET
D. HANSON, Otherwise Known as
l\Irs. Heber Hanson, JOHN ANGUS 1
l\LA.YLAX CARTER, EDWARD M.
BECK, Other,vise Known as Reed
Beck, PAl:L E. SWARTZ, EDWARD
IJUDLO\V, and JOHN ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs and RespondentR,

vs.
ANI~1AL

BY- PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendant and App·ellant.

COLORADO

A~ppeal

From Fourth Judicial District, Utah County
Honor·able Will JJ. Hoyt, Judge

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
THO~f.A.S

E. LUDLOW, EARL LU.DLOW, Otherwise Known as T. E.
Ludlow, EDWARD B. S E L E N E,
RUFUS _A_NDERSON, MARGARET
D. HANSEN, Otherwise Known as
Mrs. Heber Hanson, JO·HN ANGUS,
MAYLAN CARTER, EDWARD M.
BECK, Otherwise Known as Reed
Beck, PAUL E. SWARTZ, EDWARD
LUDLOW, and JOHN ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
COLORADO ANThfAL BY- PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendant and Ap.pellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
The record in this case and app~ellant's brief filed
herein are voluminous, but the controlling fa.cts are
neither complicated nor numerous.
The plaintiffs own in severalty lands in a community dc~:-otcd principally to farming at Benjamin in
TJtah County, Utah. Most of the p~aintiffs have
built and regidf\ in homes upon the lands owned by
thoin. In about September, 1933, the defendant
Colorado _.\nimnl By-Products Company, ·began the
col10ction of CfU'CRf'·Ses of dead animals at' the p~rem"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ises at Benjan1in for ship·ment to other rendering
plants operated by the defendant. The plant was
originally constructed as a place for the collection
of hides. In December, 1934 a cooker was placed in
the plant to cook the meat and bones of dead ani..
mals and to manufacture therefrom fertilizer, bone.
meal, poultry feed and tallow for soap manufacture.
Bones were also collected and placed in a pile at the
plant. In about February, 1935 the cookers were
put in operation. (Tr. 193-4; Ab. 50).
Dead animals were collected from Utah, Juab, Sanpete and W a~atch Counties and taken to the plant
for the manufacture of the above mentioned pro~
ducts. The defendant also occasionally brought
aged or crippled animals, bones and scraps from
hutcher shops for use at the plant.
P. H. Soble . the president of the defendant con1~
pany thus states the amount of animal products
that were cooked at the plant: Forty thousand
( 40,000) to fifty thousand ( 50,000) pounds of bone
per month: Fifteen thousand (15,000) to twenty
thousand (20,000) pounds of meat p·er monil1, and
ten thousand (10,000) to twelve thousand (12,000)
·pounds of offal per month. ( Tr. 997-9; A b. 246 to
247). Defendant received and cooked bet,veen fifty
(50) ·and seventy-five (75) large animals per
month, besides smaller animals such as dead pigs
a.nd sheep (Tr. 98[); Ah. 242).
On or about April 8, 1937 the plant was destroyed
by fire. In about May or June, 1937, the company
... ommenced the erection of a new plant at the site
of the old one. Soon after the commencement vf thl)
construction of the new p~ant some or a.ll of thrplaintiffs protested to the County CommissioT'el'R of
TJtah County against its erection. P. H. Sohl0 'va~
at one of the meetings with the County ComtnisRioner~ and assured the commissioners that if perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mitted to erect and operate a new plant, it would be
so operated as not to constitute a nuisance. (Tr.
1002-3; A b. 247).

This action was commenced on August 18, 1937.
A temporary restraining order was issued 0~1 Aug. .
ust 23, 1937. 'l'he trial was commenced on .April 3,
1939 and continued for several days. On June 7,
1939, Judge William L. Hoyt, who heard the cause,
signed a memorandum of decision in "\vhich he gave
a brief outline of the evidence m1d concluded tbat
the defendant had been and was op·erating a nuis ..
ance and that the P'laintiffs \vere entitled to appropriate relief, but that because the defendant had
expended a large sum of money before the action
was commenced, plaintiffs should not he granted
injunctive relief, but that if so advised, plaintiffs
might amend their pleading or file a supplementary
complaint and be heard as to the da.mages that they
had and would sustain. (Tr. 99).

Thereafter a supplemental complaint was filed and
evidence offered as to the damages sustained by
plaintiffs, a.nd each of them. The judgment app·ealed from was entered upon all the evidence. It "rill
be noted that the judgment fixes the damages to
which each of the parties is entitled and concludes
that unless the aforesaid damages are paid by the
defendant within sixty (60) days from date of entry of the decree herein, then plaintiffs are entitled
to an injunction restraining defendant from operating said plant until said damages are paid.

In our discussion we shall not attempt to follow the
ord~r in which appellnnts have argued the questiong nl'ef.lent~d, a~ in our view it ,viii tend to clarify
thP i~~rt~{~ and e11able this Court to better follow our
nr'C'11P""rs'n1~ lvv· t3kir!.~' up first those questions of fa.ct
nnd ]u,v ,~~hich ~re common to ali of the plaintiffs,
R~ "':"'"~ dol~(l ni t:he trinl.
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rrHE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT'S PLANT IS A NUISANCE
A nuisance is defined by our statutes as follows:
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 104-56-1:
''Anything which is injurious to health, or
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of p~roperty, so
as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and
the subject of an action. Such action may
he brought by any person whose property
is injuriously affected, or whose personal
enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance; and
by the judgment the. nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages may also be
l'ecovered~''

There were numerous witnesses who testified in
this case as to the nature of defendant's plant, and
particularly concerning the obnoxious odors that
emanated therefrom; and also that the plant was
a breeding place for flies and rats. After most of
the plaintiffs' evidence was in, the court, upon the
request of defendant visited the plant. (Tr. 526).
The following witnesses called by plaintiffs, in substance testified:

S. I. GREER was employed by defendant from the
time the site for the plant 'vas purchased in 1933.
As ori_ginally constructed the plant was to be uRed
for storing and collecting hides. Cookers were first
put into the p~lant in 1934 and cooking of meat, bone~
and offal began ahout February 1, 1935. That "·hen
~e learned cookers were to b,e put into the plant he
resigned. That when the plant began cooking,
horses, cows, pigs and sheep were cooked. That
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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about si..~ty ( 60) horses and cows were cooked per
month and "~ere gathered fronJ the counties of, Utah,
Wasatch, Juab and Sanp·ete. The .animals were
taken to the plant and there cut up and<skihned on
the floor. The blood and refuse was drained into
an open sump and there allo"'"ed to stand until it
seeped a"~ay. In addition to the animal~ that 'vere
collected, offal and intestines \Vere gathered from
the slaughter yards in the vicinity and taken to
the plant and used. That many of the aniinals
broug-ht in "~ere decomposed and very nearly
rotten.
The odor from the cooking · of these animals goes
off into the atmosphere and the sewage goes into
the open sump at the p~lant. That the odors emana.t~
ing from the plant are. v~ry nauseatin,g a.nd extend
as far as a mile from the plant. That. the distance
the odor \Yi11 travel depends upon t:re ~onditiori- of
the atmosphere. That flies by the millions .collect at
the plant. That dry bones were always piled at the
·plant. Tha.t the bone pile was a good breeding place
for rats and many rats were in the hone pile and
there made· nests and raised their young. That
such condition always existed at the plant. '~ehat at
times the plant is operated t\venty-four hours per
day. That the plant takes care of about a ton of
Rtuff daily. (Tr. 2 to 17). Tha.t the odor of thA
plant gets into one's clothes and hair, and it is very
rlifficult to remove the same. (Tr. 77). That he
quit 'vorking, for the defendant company because of
i.tR condition and its effect upon his health. (Tr. 28).
THOMAS E. LUDLO,W, one of the plaintiffs, testified that his home is about-two hundred (200) rods
west and ten nortn from the plant; that when the
wind blows from the east and the cookers are in
operation the odor from the plant makes it almost
lmpossible to breathe; that it comes right into the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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house and wakes you up; that these odors corne to
his place when the wind is blowing from the east,
and occurs about t"rice a week; that the smell is
hard to describe but it is much the same as decayed
meat. (Tr. 101).
FRANK SCOTT testified that he has been on a
number of the farms in _the neighborhood of the
plant and that about three years ago he was worktng on the roof of Rufus Anderson's home 'vhen
the smell came ; that he was compelled to come off
the roof; that it made him vomit; that while at Mr.
Selene's farm he could not eat be·cause of the
smell; that the smell was terrible, and much like
tha.t of rotten dead animals. (Tr. 104-106).
IDA SWARTZ thus described the odor coming
from the defendant's plant: This odor is thick; it
just doesn't go down; when you try to breathe it
chokes you ; makes you sick; you can almost che'v
the stuff; it makes you very sick to your stomach;
it is absolutely imp~ossible with that odor to sit rlo"\vll
and try to eat a meal; you feel like you are che,,-,ring
a rotten, decayed animal when you sit down to dinner; it makes you deathly sick; wakes you up at
night; wakes the children up at night. (Tr. 134).
The odor came from the old and the new plants;
the odor comes every day at times; at times 've
have been compelled to leave our home because of
the odor. (Tr. 135). It comes throu~hout ihe
year, but is worse in the summer. Many flies come
from defendant's plant; that since the defendant's
plant was constructed they a.re troubled 'vith rats.
(Tr. 136).

JAMES ALBERT WEST testified that whenever
the east wind blows the odor comes from the plant
to his place; the odor smells liks a dead animal in
your yard; it comes nearly every day, but is wors0
~omP days than other~.
(Tr. 171). It enm(\s into
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the house; it is especially bad in the summer time ~
the flies at times are so thick you can't see out of
the windo\Ys; the flies a.re blue and black blow-flies.

(Tr. 172).
EDWARD SELENE thus describes the odor from
the plant: It is very rotten. On September 2tith
it kept us up all night and I couldn't sleep; I have a
good stomach but the odor makes me sick; my wife
and children were also awakened by the odor; that
has occurred on many occasions. (Tr. 182). 'I'he
odor is there almost constantly. (Tr. 183). The
defendant takes decayed meat into the plant all
the time. (Tr. 196).

HAZEL ANDERSON, who lives about four hundred (400) rods from the plant described the odor
thus: The odor from the plant causes a burning
in your throat; wakes you up at night; the s1nell
keeps you a'vake at night; it is very unpleasant; we
have to keep the doors and windows closed to try
to keep it out; the odor turns you sick. (Tr. 211).
It comes about every day. (Tr. 212). Since the
plant came 've have had trouble with Inany lng
blow-flies.
EDNA SEI_jENE thus described the odor: That
rotten smell from the plant has a'vakened me and
tny children at nights; t}1a.t the children have cried
and cried at night; they couldn't sleep; that has
heen the condition sjnce the ne'v plant was con~:trncted. The smell continues about a11 the time;
n~pecially during- the SHmmer time. (Tr. 225). You
can't on en your vtindo,vs; the odor is the most
nan~eatin~ I have sm.elled; at times I am unable
to Pat n1y meals beeausP of the Rmell. (Tr. 225).

JOHN ANGUS testified that at tim-es the odor from
defenda.nt 's plant was almost unbearable, especially
'vh0n thP 'vind blo,,-rR fro1n th0 ea~t. It iF; worRe in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the su1nmer ; that they are awakened by the odors.
The odors occur nearly every day and about twice
a week during the night time. (Tr. 257-8).
PAUL E. SWARTZ described the smell. as. being
the rottenest smell I have ever smelledt:it is thick;
you can't breath.e; when it _comes in at .·meal tilnes
you can't eat; a lot: of times the smell brings-"it all
back~
( Tr. 317). It sometimes comes for thirty
minutes; sometimes two or three hours, sometimes
all day; it generally comes· every day; it continues
throughout the year. (Tr.· 318). '··
.,
JOHN ANDERSON testified that the odor was
very rotten; that it is present a part of every qay
\vhen the cooker is in operation; 'arid the odors come
into the house and \Yake you up at night. It is very
nauseating. (Tr. 345-6).
-,
,.
j

RUF·us ANDERSON described the odor as a sicl{ening smell; it. smarts the nostrils and throat; it
sometimes comes three or four times a day, then it
rnay miss a day or t,vo. (Tr. 345-6).

HEBER EUGENE HANSEN described it as ve.ry
nauseating; it is penetrating; it g·ets in your clothes
and your clothes smell for hours· ·after it ceases.
(Tr. 415-16). It is p·resent practically every day,
but it is somewhat intermittent by a change in the
wind. It comes at night and you cannot sleep. (Tr.
416).
JO,HN R. LUDLOW testified that at his home,
about two hundred rods from the plant, the odors
are the rottenest that I have ever con1e in contact
\vith since they commenced cooki.ng; that the odor
is that of dead animals; that the odor con1es vvhen
the breeze blows from the east; it ocenrs nPa rly
every day; that the odor is getting 'vorse. · (rrr.
444).
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LLOYD M. FARNER, a resident physician and
surgeon and a deputy State health cominissioner
testified to being at the plant; that the plant "\Vas
very unsanitary; that offensive odors came from
the plant; that after he had been at the plant a
short time and returned to Provo he could still de ..
teet the smell; probably from his clothes. (Tr.
544).

P. P. THOMAS, President of the Commercial Bank
of Spanish Fork, testified that since the plant was
constructed he had frequently passed along the
highway and had observed the stink there and it
smelled like a dead cow. (Tr. 861).

CHARLES E. HAWKINS, a former county assessor of Utah County, testified that he had been near
defendant's plant a number of times, and that the
odor that comes from the plant at certain times is
practically unbearable to people that are not
accustomed to it; that it has driven him away from
his "\vork there; that he got sick and could not remain near the plant. (T.r. 9"40).
THOl\rfAS M. ANDERSON testified that he was
familiar 'vith the plant and gave testimony as to
the depreciation in the value of plaintiffs' property
by reason thereof. (Tr. 1011).
MAYLAN CARTER testified that he owns land
near defendant's plant and that it smells like a
dead animal; that he couldn't build on his property because of the smP-11. (Tr. 1043).
Lu\.,VRENCE C..JOHNSON describes the odor in
the vicinity of the plant as very obnoxious; you
enn 't staly in it. (Tr. 1057).

Nearly all of the witnesses testfied that the odor
from thP plant had not improved after it was
claim0d by defendant that it attempted to ·control
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the odor by some slight changes 1n the construc-tion.
In addition to above, see testimony of Rufus 1\J.!..
derson, ( Tr. 1121) ; and tha.t of Hazel Anderson,
( Tr. 1113) ; also Edwin Selene, ( Tr. 1118).
Most of the witnesses called by the defendant ~es .
tified that there were odors in and about the plant,
and some of them testified that such odol's were
very obnoxious. See testimony of Dr. Joseph
Hughes, who was called as an expert by the defendant. (Tr. 575, 579, 580). Also defendant'~
·witness John W. Staker, (Tr. 650).

We have heretofore pointed out that the trial judg<.l
before whom the case was heard, visited the premises during the trial. In the light of such fact, the
.rule that the trial judge is in a better position to
deter1nine the facts than is a reviewing Court, is
especially applicable. The only conclusion permisM·
r:,ible is that the trial court upon his visit to the
plant found from first hand information, the facts
to he as claimed by plaintiffs and as testified to by
them and their witnesses.
In the foregoing brief snmma.ry of the evidence we
have referred to the transcript. using the page
number sho,vn in the index and at the top of the
page rather than the page numbers written on the
bottom of the transcript, 'vhich la.tter numbers are
referred to in the abstract. The abstract fails to
fully convey the import of plaintiffs' testimony;
especially as to the nature, intensity a.nd effect of
the o-dors that emanated from the plant; the condition of the open sump at the plant and the flies
and rats that are drawn to and breed at the plant.
In light of that fact we earnestly ur,g.e, espec.ially
on the question of whether or not defendant 'R pla11t
constitutes a nuisance, that this Court examine the
transcript, as reliance on the ahstra.ct 'vill not pre ..
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sent the real picture. Defendant offered some evidence tending to show that other rendering plants
were constructed near places where people reside
and that no serious objection 'vas made to the same.
Such testimony, ho,vever, is of little or no value.
The fact that a rendering plant is located a.t the
Cudahy Packing- Company in North Salt Lake
where only fresh mea.ts are handled, and one at
Twin Falls where no considerable amount of
offensive odors are emitted does not change the fact
that defendant's plant at Benjamin is so constructed
or operated, or both, that it makes living in its
vicinity next to impossible for normal people.
Some evidence "\Vas offered toucl1ing the construction of the Benjamin plant and that it -,vas similar
to the construction of other plants and therefore
should not give off the odors complained of, but
not\nthstanding such evide:r1ce, the fact ren1ains
that the Benjamin plant, ever since cookers were
]nstalled and put into operation, has almost constantly given off these offensive odors and attracted flies and rats, "rhich has seriously affected the
comfort, if not the health, of those who are required to reside or 'vork in the vicinity of the plant.
That is the concluRion of the trial court and we
submit that no other conclusion is permissible under
the evidence.

The defendant offered evidence tending to show
that some of the plaintiffs had manure in their
yards and that onP of them, Thomas Ludlow, had
part of the remains of aead animals in his yard.
Ruch evidence merelv establishes the fact that the
n.l'(la in and nbout d.efendant's plant is a farming
r.()mmunity, subject to the conditions found gen ..
f\r~=tllv in such commnnities. Thomas Ludlow testifi0r1 .thnt hP either buried or burned any animals
th.nt mny die on his premises within a short time
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after they died. (Tr. 831). No such precautions
were taken by the defendant.
All of the evidence shows that la.rge quantities,
sometimes several tons, of the bones of dea,d animals were customarily stored at defendant's plant.
Defendant also offered in evidence a number or
photographs of the premises of some of the plaintiffs. Many of the photographs were taken on
April 3rd, when it is quite apparent that the yards
bad not dried up and the accumulation of winter
manure had not yet been removed. It is also
apparent that the photographs were taken only of
those parts of the premises as were most unsightly. It might be that the surroundings of some of
the ho1nes of plaintiffs are not as sightly as could
be desired, but they are none the less their homes
where they must live, and. it ill becomes the defendant to insist that because the surroundings of
some of the homes are not as sightly as they mig'ht
he, defendant is at liberty to so pollute the atu1osphere that during both day and night plaintiffs
are compelled to suffer the discomfort of breathing the foul air -caused by defendant's p~ant or give
up their homes and farms.
So long as defendant merely maintained unsightly
premises and stored tons of bones plaintiffs did not
complain, but " 7hen defendant, by its cooking operation of partially decayed animals and offal, so .POl·
luted the air that plaintiffs could not live in their
homes in comfort and were confronted with the fact
that such conditions would continue indefinitely,
they brought this aetjon for injunctive relief. and
having been denied that relief they sought dan1ages, the only recourse available to them to redrP.s~
the '\Vrong·s complained of.
Defendant also offered evidence tending to show
that at times when animal~ died they were not
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properly burned or otherwise disposed of. 'l,he
fact that someone ".as derelict in such pa.rticular is
no legal justification for defendant maintaining a
nuisance, such as is shown by the evidence in this
case. Our statutes,
R. S. U. 1933, 103-41-1 provide that:
'' \rhatever is dangerous to human life or
health and \Yhatever renders soil, air, wa.ter
or food impure or un\vholesome, are declared to be nuisances and to be illegal,
and every person, either owner, agent or
occupant, having aided in creating or contributing to the same, or \vho may support,
continue or retain any of them, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.''
While in this case doctors were called and testified
that the odors about defendant's plant were not
likely to spread disease germs, none of them had
the temerity to testify tha.t such air is pure and
wholesome. If, as the evidence shows, the air at
times becomes so obnoxious as to cause nausea,
make it impossible to eat and retain a meal, and to
keep p·eople awake at night, such facts do not require the testimony of a physician to convince a
court that such air is both impure and unwholesome, and is calculated to injure the health of one
\vho is compelled to breathe the same. Such facts
nr0 matters of common knowledge of which courts
w·ill take judicial notice.
Defendant also contended that because the Union
Pacific Railroad Company is in close proximity to
the plant, the Denver & Rio Grande Railway and
a pea vinery are within about a mile, the Utah-Idaho
Sugar Company about two miles, and the Columbia
Stf'Pl Cornpnny about ten miles from defendant's
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plant; and because defendant's plant is loca.ted on a
site formerly used for a brick yard, the place where
the plant is located is an industrial area and therefore plaintiffs have no leg.al cause to complain.
Particular stress is placed upon the pea vinery
located about a mile west of defendant's plant, bew
cause unpleasant odors, at some times of the year,
emanate from that plant. Even though it be conceded that the pea vinery is a nuisance that is no
justification for the defendant maintaining an
additional nuisance. Moreover, the clear preponderance of the evidence shows that the odors
from the pea vinery do not reach the premises of
the plaintiffs.
The dividing line between an industrial area and
a residential area, especially in the absence of a
zoning ordinance, is of necessity impossible of exact determination, but even though the area. where
defendant's·plant is located can be designated as an
industrial area, still such fact does not excuse the
defendant from maintaining a nuisance .. One may
.., be guilty of maintaining a nuisance in an industrial area. In the case of
Kinsman, et al, v. Utah Gas & Coke Corn/
pany, 53 Utah 10; 177 P. 418,
it appears that notwithstanding the defendant ·company made every effort to prevent offensive odors·
from escaping from the gas plant, and where
periodically and at times continuously offensive
and noxious odors were coming from the gas pla.nt
and entering upon the premises of the plaintiffs
and into their homes, and notwithstanding no
serious sickness resulted to the occup,ants of the
adjoining premises, this Court held that it had no
doubt hut that the plaintiffs were disturbed from
the full enjoyment of their rights and were en-
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titled to reco~er because of the acts of the defendant in operating the gas plant.
To tJ1e san1e effect are
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Coinpany, 64 Utah 437; 2'31 P. 813.
No other or different doctrine is announced in the
case of
Dahl v. Utah (lil R.efining' Company, 'll
Utah 1; 262 P. 269.
In the Dahl case this Court cites with approval a
number of cases from other jurisdictions and other
authorities. The following doctrine is there quoted
with approval:
·
"The la'v relating to private nuisances is
a la\\.,. of degree, and usually turns on a
question of fact, whether the use is reasonable or not under the circumstances. No
hard and fast rule controls the subject, for
a use that is reasonable under one set of
facts would be unreasonable under ~n
other. Whether the use of pTope-rty to
carry on a lawful business, which creates
smoke or noxious gases in excessive quantities, amounts to a nuisance, depends on
the facts of each particular case. Location, priority of occupation, and the fact
that the injury is only occasional, are not
conclusive, but are to be considered in connection with all the evidence, and the inference drawn from an the facts proved
'Yhether the controllinp- fact exists that the
n~e is unreasonable. If that fact is found
a nuisance is established, and the plaintiff j~ entitled to relief in some form."
"Whether the n~e of nroperty by one perRon i~ reasonable, with reference to the
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con1fortahle enjoyment of his own prop . .
erty by another, generally depends upon
many and varied facts, such a.s location,
nature of the use, chara·cter of the neighborhood, extent and frequency of the injury,
the effect on the enjoyment of life, health.
and property, and the like.''
'' vVhat an1ount of annoyance or inconvenience caused by oth~rs in the lawful use
of their property will constitute a nuisance,
is largely a question of degree dep·ending
on varying circumstances, and is incapable
of exact definition. The injury or annoy.
ance must be of a real and substantial
nature, and the pertinent inquiry ordinarily is \\'hether the acts or conduct proved
are such as materially to interfere 'with
the ordinary comfort, physically, of hun1an
existence,' or are materially detrimental to
the reasonable use, or value of the property."
The authorities generally are to that effe-ct.
The facts in the Dahl case, supra, are not comparable to the case in hand. The odors tliere complained of were the ordinary odor of g.as and oil,
which is common and usual in many public places,
The odor emanating from defendant's plant is, as
described by the witnesses, that of de·ca.ying meat.,
1nuch the same as that 'vhich comes from a rottPn
animal in your yard. lt is difficult to conceive of
a more offensive odor or one more calculated to
destroy the comfort and enjoyment of the life of
those who are ·compelled- to endure it. The la,v. .
making power of this State has so recognized such
to he the fact by making it a nuisa.nce to put the
carcasses of any dead animal into any river, lakr,
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pond, strPet, alley or publie high,Yay, or road in
conunon use; or "\Yho attempts to destroy the same
by fire within one-fourth of a mile of any city or
town.
R. S. U. 1933, 103-41-6.

In the Dahl rase the oil refining company 'vas
t·stablished in 1900, "\Yhich must have been ahout a
quarter of a century before plaintiff in that case
broug·ht her action. The case was decided by this
Court on June 20, 1927.
In this case plaintiffs sought the aid of the County
Commissioners of Utah County to p·revent the rebuilding of defendant's plant very soon after they
learned that it "\Yas to be reconstructed. Such action
on the part of the plaintiffs was doubtless because
they had exp~erienced the obnoxious odors during
the time the cookers were being operated in the
original plant. The president of defendant company assured the County Commissioners that the
ne\\"~" plant would he so constructed and operated as
to eliminate the odors. That was not done.
Substantially all of the 'vitnesses \vho testified
concerning- the odors emanating from the new
plant testified that such odors 'vere as strong and
offensive as were those which emanated from the
original plant. Some testified that the odors emanating from the reconstructed plant were worse than
those V\ hich came from the old plant and that they
'Yerp gettjn.~ '\vorse. Dou htless as defendant extended its business and hanled in and cooked more
partially decomposed animals· and offal, the odors
naturally would be stronger and more continuous.
7

Tn the Dahl case the eviden·ce sho,ved that the defendant company bad used every known means in
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)vent the escape .of fumes, gases or offensive odors
from the plant. In this case a feeble attempt was
made to show that defendant too had attempted to
prevent the escap·e of odors. A witness was called
who was familiar with the Cudahy Packing Com..
pany at North Salt Lake and its operation. In the
Cudahy plant however only fresh meat is used,
while in defendant's plant the carcasses of animals,
a.s the court found, that have been dead a.t least a
day or two were taken into the plant. That such
animals, especially during. the summer time, wonld
be partially decayed cannot be seriously doubted.

Mr.. Greer, a former employee of defendant com..
pany, testified that some of the meat used by de ..
fendant was rotten when it arrived at the plant.
The Cudahy Packing Company ha.s constructed a
pip~line for about two miles to carry off the waste
materials and odors from the plant. The defend. .
ant permits the waste materials from its plant to
drain into an op~en sump next to the plant and
thP-re remain until it evaporates or seeps away.
More significant than either of these facts is,
aecording to defendant itself, a rendering plant
can be constructed and operated so .that no appreciable odor vlill emanate therefrom, and yet the evid~nce here sho,vs that this plant is not so construct..
ed or operated, as otherwise the obnoxious odors
coming from the p~lant 'vould not be there.
Other cases which support or tend to support the
fact that defendant's plant is a nuisance are:
-McClury v. Highland Boy . Gold Mining
Company, 140 Fed. 951.
Green v. Sun Company, 32 Pa. Super. Ct.
521.
Millet v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Com..
pany, 144 Minn. 475; 177 N. W. 641;
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179 N. "\V. 682; notes in 9 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 695.
20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466.
31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899.
3 A. L. R. 312.
Coker v. Berge, 9 Ga. 425; 54 Am. Dec. 347.
Block v. Batemore, 149 Md. 39; 129 Atl. .
887.
Trowbridge v. Lansing, 237 Mich. 402.
50 A. L. R. 1014, 212 N. W. 73.
Lennon v. Butte, 67 Mont. 101; 214 Pac.
1101.
Templeton v. Williams, 59 Ore. 160; 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 468; 116 P. 1062.
Paris .v. Philadelphia, 63 Pa. Sup. Ct. 41;
50 l\. L. R. 1020.
Hall v. Carter, 157 S. · W. 461.
Jacob v. Bingham, 227 S. W. 249.

PL~'-\INTIFFS'

CAUSES Q:F ACTION ARE NOT
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIO,NS.
We have heretofore pointed out that the site upon
which defendant's plant "\Vas constructed was purchased in April or May, 1933. In September, 1933,
!·be defendant bega.n using the plant for- collecting
dead animals to be shiprped to other plants owned
by the defendant. In December, 1934, the _defendant installed rendering equipment and it was not
-until about February 1, 1935 that the plant began the
operation of cooking and rendering the carcasses oi
dead anitnals. .A~bout April 8, 1937, the original
plnnt burned do,vn and a.bout 1\t!ay or June of 1937
'vork 'vas commenced on the reconstruction of a uew
plant on the site of the old plant.
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The complaint in this action was filed on .A. ugust
19, 1937. The defendant pleads in bar of the action
R. S. ·u. 104-·2-24 and 104-2-30. 'I'he forn1er section
provides that an action for trespass upon or injury
~o real p·roperty must be ctrmm~nced vvitl1in three
years. The latter section provides that any action
not otherwise p_rovided-- for -in the code must be
commenced within four years. It will be observed
that plaintiffs brought their action within three
yea.rs from the time defendant installed its equipJnent for the operation of._~ rendering plant and
that the rendering plant was not placed in operation until about Februa.Ij 1, 1935, while the action
was comm~nced .Qn August 19, 1937; that the original plant 'was destroyed hy fire in April, 1937, and
the c_onstructiol). of the present plant was barely
commenced when this actio,n. was .filed. The p-rincipal cause of th.e ,wro.!lgs complained of by these
plaintiffs was arid "is_ the q:pe~ation
the rendering pJant. Moreover,' in any event the pleaded
statute of limitations is. not available to the defendant under the fa.cts in this case .

·of

._. Stree.t v-. -. Northport . ~linin-g & Smelting
Co. (Wash;),'70\ P. 266.Wright and Others v. illrich, 40 Colo. 437;
91 p. 4:),. . ' ; '
"\Vestern. Union Telegraph Co. v. -Moyle, 51
Kans. 203.; 22 P-. 895.: ·:
Sodeburg v. Chica.go, etc. ~ailway Co., 167
_IlL_ 123; 149 N. W. 82.
Morey ·v. Essex ·County, 94 N. J. L.
427, 439; 110 Atl.. _905. -.
~ . ,~~nsm~p.- :v. ,Ut~h G~~ ~ ~- Cok~ Co., 53 Utah
-... 10~' 177 P. 418~. . ..,
. .
· Thackerv v. Union Portland Cement Com.
pariy, 64 Ut~h,-437~;· ~31 P. 813,
a.nd cases there ri ted.
.
·'
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THERE IS NO MISJOINDER OF
PLAINTIFF.

P~RTIES

It is said in
Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies,
\T ol. 2, Page 1081, Section 743, that:
''The general rule in actions of equitable cognizance is that all persons materially interested either legally or be·neficially
in the subject matter of the suit must he
made parties either as plaintiffs or de-fendants so that a complete decree may be
made, binding upon all parties. And it is
said that although courts of la\v require no
n1ore parties than those immediately interested in the subject matter, in equity all
persons, including those remotely interested therein, may be joined and are often
necessary parties.''

In the same volume at Page 1112, Section 760, it
is said:
''Where, therefore, there is a community of
interest among all of the claimants in the
questions of law and fact involved, in the
~~·en·~rnl controversy, or in kind and form
of relief demanded by or against each individual metnber of a numerous body, juris . .
diction should be exercised although there
i:~ no common title nr community of right
or o£ interest in the subject matter among
th~ individuals.''

In ] 4 R. C. L., Page 3.28, ·Section 29,.
it. is said tha.t:
'' Conrt~ of equity have always exercised
n sound di~(Jreti on in determining ,vhether
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parties are properly joined in a suit, with
the object of the most efficient. administration of justice. The "joinder therefore
a.s ·complainants of persons who suffer
special injury by reason of the proximity
of their prop~erties to a nuisance which it
is sought to restrain l.s proper. In a similar manner owners of .separate parcels of
real property 1nay unite in a suit to enjoin
the repairing or rebuilding of a wooden
building within the fire limits of a municipality, whereby their· p~roperty will be
diminished in value, and subjected to increased danger of destruction by fire.
Their ·common danger and common interest in the relief sought authorize them to
join- in one· action.''

It will serve no useful purpose to multiply the
.authorities or· ·cite cases from other jurisdiction~
because the law is settled in this jurisdiction by the
cases of
·Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah
10; 177 P. 418 and
Wasatch Oil Refining Company v. Wade,
92 Utah 50; 63 P. (2d) 1070.
As we understand counsel for the defendant they
are not relying .. so much on their claim of misjoinder of parties pla~ntiff so long as they· .were
seeking injunctive relief, ·but \vhen the court below
denied plaintiffs' injunctive relief the case was at
an end and the court co-uld'not properly proceed to
hear or determine the question of damages, if any,
sustained by .the plaintiffs. . The same. question
'vas urged and the same argument submitted to this
Court (in which one of counsel for the defendant
herein participated) artd decided against defend··
r

,

I

1

"'
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ant's contention in the Wasatch Oil Refining Company case, sup·ra, after an able and thorough
presentation of the question of whether or not
in a proper action for injunctive relief damages may be a'varded after the injunctive relief
l1as been denied. In the Wasatch Oil Refining
Company case, supra, this Court reaffirmed the
doctrine announced in the Kinsman case wherein
it is said that:
"In an equity action where the prayer is
for both_ specific and general relief the
court having acquired jurisdiction of thA
parties and the subject matter will retain
that jurisdiction until justice has been
done, although the equitable relief is denied, especially in this State where there
is but one form of civil action.''
''Where fifty-nine persons bringing an
action to restrain as a nuisance the operation of a gas plant and for general relief,
each having sep1arate and individual claims
or right of action for damages growing
out of the same trespass on the part of
the defendant company, the only separate
issue being the amount of compensation due
each plaintiff, the court should, on denying equitable relief allow the plaintiffs
to a.m~nd and determine the amount to
'vhich each plaintiff is entitled, without requiring them to bring separate actions.''

The foregoing quotations are from the sylla.bi in
the KinRmnn ca~~ a..nd reflect the opinion of thP
Court. In the course of that op-inion this Court
quoted from

Pomeroy Eq. Jur., Page 354, where it iR
~nin:
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'' vVhenev~r .th~ · true spirit of the ref orin · .
procedure. has b·e/en accepted and followed
the courts ·Jiot' on1y permit regal and equitjoined and legal
able causes of action to·
and equitable -r-emedies to-'- be: prayed for
and obtairied,rbut will~.~g.rant :pu'rely legal
relief of ..posse_ssion,: compensa.te damages,
peCU:J!if!T)! reqoveries__andi_t)J.B 1~1:}~~' ..in additio~ to-_or::_jP::. pla.~e .gJ:_ th~ ~PftGific equitable
relief denied. In a great vari.ety of cases _
which would not have ·come within the
· scope· of th~ gerlerallprinciple as it was regarded and' acted ll:pop. by.'oriiinal equity
jurisd~~tion and in ;which-' therefore a court
. of: equity wquld.''have refrained from exercising· ·such· i .Jiir~sdi~tioll:. '' ··

be

In .the' W'asfttCh

'on Refining ,.Comp<any

case v.

Wade, supra-,· it .is~ said that t:Q.e·· Kinsman case cannot :now be disregarded a:IldJ we. have no desire to
rev_e~~e~:or: qualify. any:,of the p~inciples for which
it stands. · It has been· .affirmed and reaffirmed as
to one, or ~:more. 'of lhe~ principles announced :therein in, the following· :eases in this- Court:
•

Utah

•

•

..J

'

oa: Refini4g 'Q,O~~Ilpy

-.

•

~ :Qistf:ipt

1 •.

CQurt, 60_'V"tah 428"; ·2u9 p. 624 ... ·
Thackery . v.' Unio:q Portl~<l: C;~rp~:p.t~;ICorn
p·~ny, ._6~ Uta~_437 ;:231_ P. _813~_,
Mads~n.- v. Bonneville Irri-gation Dist.,. 65
. ·utah 571; 239-.P~ 781. ~ '
· ·r.
Trenchard. v.-. Reay, ~10 Utah 19; 25.7 P.
1046.
McMoneg.al v. ~r~tcb.·· Loan~& ..Tillst Gom-.
. , . ~ pany, .75 Ut~:b- .. 470; .28q_ P. ~30 ... ,.
. t-~
Norback v. Board of Directors of Church ; . !• ~ i ~~t~xtsio~,.Sp.G~Qty, ~Q~·Uta~ 5.0~;. 37.. p.
( 2d) 339.
'' .
' .'
~ '
~

~-

•

.

,. '

'
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'l"he facts in this case briug it squarely \\'ithin the
la\v announced in the 1\:.insman and Wasatch Oil
l{efining Uo1npauy cases, supra .
.At the conclusion of the evidence offered in support of the claim for injunctive relief the court
iound that the defendant con1pany in the construction and operation of its plant had created and was
maintaining a nuisance and that plaintiffs were
entitled to appropriate relief. However, in light
of the fact that defendant had expended a large
sum of money, approximately Thirty Thousand
Dollars, according to the president of the· company,
and the further fact that plaintiffs had not acted
pron1ptly in seeking equitable relief, the trial court
refused to grant the injunctive relief, but held that
plaintiffs were entitled. to appropriate relief because of the wrongs complained of, and upon further hearing a\Yarded damages \Vhich are clearly
in lieu of injunctive helief.
The facts in this case do not bring it within the
doctrine of most of the cases cited and relied upon
by the defendant, but \Ve shall not undertake the
task of reviewing those cases in this brief, as most
of them have already been considered by this Court
in the Wasatch Oil Refining Company case, supra,
and a conclusion reached contrary to the contention here made by the defendant. It is clea.r here
that the court below refused the injunction and substituted therefor the damages sustained and to be
~ustained by the p1aintiffs upon the authority of a
doctrine repeatedly announced by this Court, and
in order to save the defendant from the complete
loss of its investment in its plant. It m.ay be conceded that some of the cases cited by the defendant, especially from jurisdictions which have not
adopted the reform procedure, are not in accord
·with the approved procedure in this jurisdiction,
hut as already indicateil. tl1i~ Court. haR refused to
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follow such doctrine, although the matter has been
repeatedly presented to it. Before leaving this
phase of the case it may be noted that defendant
in its brief has considerable to say about it having
been denied a jury trial. A jury trial was not demanded by defendant in the court belo\v, nor did
the defendant join in plaintiffs' request for a jury.
Had the defendant so requested it may well be that
the trial court would not have denied the request
1nade by the plaintiffs.
In the Kinsman case this Court said that ''the
court may call to its assistance a jury to determine
the amount, if any, of such damages as in other
equitable proceedings.''
In the 'Vasatch Oil Refining Company case it is
said:
''Where ho,vever the case is one of equity
ju ~isdiction and the question of damages
is before the court, to be granted if proved.
either in substitution for or in addition
to equitable relief, the denial of a jur~r trial
is not the denial of any legal right. W eining-er v. l\{etropolitan Life Ins. Co., 359
Ill. 584, 195 N. E, 420, 98 A. L. R. 169;
R.hoRdes Y. Mr N a.m_ara, 135 !!Iich. 644, 98
N. ""'.V. 392:, Jacob v. Schiff (Sup.), 149

N.Y. S. 273.''

PL.AINTIFFS ARE ENTITLJ1JD TO DAMAG~8
IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE D~E
PRECIATIO·N IN THE VALUE OF THEIR
REAl.J PROPER.TY O~CCASIONED BY 'rJT~~~
OPERATION OF DEFEND~t\NT'S PLANT.
In its brief defendant contends that the trial court
did not adopt the proper measure of damages in
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that the defendant might diseontinue the operation
of its plant. So far as this record discloses there
is nothin~g- in the evidence to support such a contention. On the contrary, all of the evidence sho"r~
that the defendant company intends to continue permanently to operate the plant as it is and has been
operated. Notwithstanding defendant, through its
president, assured the County Commissioners of
Utah County that the plant would be so constructed
and operated as not to be a nuisance, the evidence
shows that it is a nuisance; and notwithstanding
the defendant claims tha.t it is constructed and
operated as well as it can be constructed and operated, the fact remains that it is and will continue
indefinitely to be a nuisance. The plant is constructed of cement and brick, which would indicate
that it is intended to be op·erated indefinitely. (Tr.
811). The fact that defendant has expended,
according to the testimony of its president, the sum
of Thirty Thousand Dollars is also an indicatiOn
that the p~lant is a permanent establishment. Under
such circumstances the authorities teach that the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover for permanent
damages. In the case of Tha.ckery v. Union Port]and Cement Company this Court in discussing a
similar question quoted with approval the following language from
4 Sutherland Damages (4th Ed.), Section
1046:
''The apparent discr.epaneies in the American caRes on this subj€'ct may perhaps be
reduced by supposing· that where the nuisance consists of a structure of a permanent
nature and intended hy thP defP-ndant to
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be so, or of a use or invasion of the plaintiff's property~ or a deprivation of soine
benefit appurtenant to it for an indefinitely
long period in the future, the injured party
has an option 'to complain of it as a pern1anent injury and recover damages for
the whole tin1e, estimating its du1·at1on
according to the defendant's purpose in
creating or continuing it, or to treat it as
a temporary wrong to be contpensated for
while it continues; that is, until the act
complained of beeomes rightful by grant,
condemnation of property or ceases by
abatement.''
In the Thackery case, supra, this Court said tha·
''No good reason appears, therefore, why,
if the parties so elect either by agreement
or by acquiescence, the court should not
permit a recovery of ·comp·ensation as for
a permanent injury in one action. Such
would necessarily tend to lessen litigation
and once for all determine the respective
rights of the parties. Many of the States,
as I understand the decisions, permit that
to be done. That right was recognized by
this Court in Kinsman v. Gas Co., 53 Utah
10' 177 p. 418. ' '
In the Kinsman case this Court sa.id:
''The cause is therefore remanded with
direetions to the District Court to a llo""
amendments to the pleadings if desired and
to pro~eed to hear testimony and detertnine
the p·a.st and future damages to each plain ..
tiff by reason of the continued a.nd np.,.pet)lal operation of the company's plant
at its present capacity, and to make sep-
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urate findings upon ~uch issue of fact and
enter judg1nent or judgments accordingly.''
Iu

~0

R. C. L., Page 4G3, Section 81,
it is said that:
,i~ ~

~·If

private nuisance is of such a character
that its continuance is necessarily, an injury and it is of a permanent character
that will continue \Yithout change from
any cause by human labor and dependent
for change in no- contingency of which the
la ""'" can ,~take notice, then the dan1ages are
original and according to the weight of
authority, a right of action at once exists
to recover the entire damage, past and
future, and one _recovery will be a bar to
any subsequent action.''

It

~ay

be not-ed- that at the trial after the ·lower
court had announced it w-ould deny injnnctive relief but would permit an _~me_ndment and receive
evidence touching the question of any damages that
plaintiffs might establish, the first witness called
by the plaintiffs touching such damages was P. P.
Thomas, who testified a.s to the depreciation in the
market value of plaintiffs' pre·misei oecasioiied by
the. :construction' a:nd operation of the plant. No
objection was :fnacle by defendant nt tne trial to the
effect that the proper measure of damages was not
the depreciation in the value ·of plaintiffs' property
, 0n a.ccount of the construction and operation of the
· de-Pendant's plant. Plail\tif.fs'. evidence was, after
Injunctive relief was denied, directed to that issue,
~ as'·was ·also -the: evidence ofthe defendant. The case
; having- been: tried upon such theory and the defendant having acquiesced therein, under the doctrine
announced by thf' Thackerv rase, supra, the defendant may' not now be heard to contend that the wrong
m.Ansnre of damag·e~;f "~Rs adopted· hy the trfal court.
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If the paintiffs "'Were to bring an action for any damage sustained by them, or either of them, after the
supplementary complaint "'\Vas filed and trial had
thereon, a complete defense to any such action
would be that the cause having been tried up,on such
theory the plaintiffs may not recover any other or
additional damages because of the operation of the
plant in the manner that it has been operated. The
darna.ges caused by the construction and operation
of the plant has forever been set at rest by this
action. In such particular this case falls squarely
vvithin the rule announced in the Thackery case,
supra. Other cases in this and other jurisdictions
which lend support to such view are the following:
Utah Oil Refining Co. v. District Court of
Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 428; 209 P.
624.
11:ast v. Sapp, 140 N. Ca.r. 533; 53 S. E. 350.
5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379.
111 Am. St. Rep. 864.
6 Ann. Cas. 384.
I..~. R. A. 1916-E, note at Page 1069,
27 A. L. R., note at P·age 161.
37 A. L. R. 812.
Sutherland Damages, 4th Ed., Sees. 10461047, and cases there· cited.

THERE W.A.S NO ER~R·OR IN REFUSING T(J
AD1\1JT EVIDENCE.
On page 90 of defendant's brief it is urged that
the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence
touching the reappraisal of lands and improye.
ments in Utah County, Utah, under the direction
of the State Tax Commission of Utah. We are at
a loss to understand upon what theory defendant
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claims the proffered evidence was comp~etent. It
is, so far a.s 've can ascertain, the uniform holding of the courts that the assessed value of land by
a public officer for the p.urpose of taxation is not
competent to sho'Y market value.

''The assessed value of land when it is
made by the assessor without the intervention of the land owner, is not admissible as
evidence of market value and no inference
can fairly be drawn that it is correct from
the failure of the owner to object on the
ground that the valuation is too low.''

18 1\.m. J ur., Page 993, Section 350.
Numerous cases are cited in the foot note which
suRtain the text. There is of coursP very good reason why that should be the law. It is a matter of
common knowledge that property in this State is
in the main assessed . at only a fractional part of
its market value. If there were any doubt about
that being so a comparison of the values which the
defendant's witnesses pla.ced upon plaintiffs' land
with the values placed thereon under the direction
of the State Tax Commission would establish such
to be the fact beyond controversy. J\foreover, to
permit the assessed value of p·roperty to be admitted in evidence in the · ma.nner sou.ght by the
defendant would have been to deprive plaintiffs of
their right to c.ross examine those who made the
assessments. To argue that an assessment rriade
nnder the direction of the State Tax Commission
stands on anv other or different basis than that of
an as~PsRor fR 'vithout foundation in law or in fact.

Complajnt is also ma.de because the trial court did
not nermit plaintiff . P'aul Swartz to testify in
greater detail as to why he became ill while he was
residing on his prop~rty nea.r defendant's plant.
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Atlr. Swartz testified on direct examination that the
smell from defendant's plant was the rottenest
srnell tha.t he had ever smelled ; that if the sn1ell
comes when he is eating he must stop and many
times the srrfell makes him vomit. On cross examination the defendant inquired about the health of
Mr. S\vartz and his family. The court permitted
defendant, over objection by plaintiffs to go into
the question of Mr. Swartz's health and the doctors he employed. (Tr. 324 to 327). If this Court
will read the extent to which the court permitted
counsel for the defendant to cross examine Mr.
s,vartz about his health and that of his vvife and
children, and as to their doctors, we feel confident
that it will marvel at the extent to which the court
permitted defendant to ·cross examine Mr. Swartz
about matters that were not testified to on direct
examination.

On page 93 _of defendant's brief complaint is made
because, a.s it is claimed, the trial court refused to
permit it to offer evidence to show the sanitary
condition of the plant. The difficulty with that
contention is that it is contrary to the fact. In
none of its rulings did the court deny defendant the
right to show the condition of the plant. Mr.
Warren E. Rasmussen testified tha.t he is a veterinarian; that he visited the plant once. He did
not inform the court as to what he found at t.he
plant, but was asked w~e.tlier or not the plant was
sanitary. The court su~tained the objection of
plaintiffs ,to such questiqn but expressly indicated
to defendant that he might sho"'~ the -condition of
the plant but that the witness Ra.smusRen V\7as not
permitted to give his opinion upon the questio\n
that the court must ultimately determine. Whereupon counsel for defendant apparently hecame
peeved .and· did noi at.trmpt to further examine tbe
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\Yitness. It "Tould seem obvious that it is not shown
that the 'vitness was comp~etent to testify as an expert, and if he "\Vere his testimony would be of no
probative value in the absence of a showing of the
facts upon which his opinion was founded. If this
Court will take the time and have the patience to
read the voluminous transcript it will find that the
trial court "yas very liberal and used the utmost
care and patience in permitting the parties, especial_
ly defendant, to offer all evidence that might bear
upon the question pTesented for determination,
and likewise allowed a wide latitude on cross examination_ If this Court can find the time and has
the patience to read the transcrip·t it cannot well
avoid reaching the conclusion that much of the evidence received did not hear up·on the issues raised
by the pleadings and cannot well find any. difficulty in concluding that the facts found hy the
court below are a.mply sustained by the evide-nce.

THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE SUPPORTS
THE DAMAGES-AWARDED TO EACH O.Ji,
THE PLAINTIFFS.
Before taking up a specific discussion of the evidence as it relates to the dan1ages sustained by each
of the pla.intiffs a few general observations on the
B~mount of damages common to all of the plaintiffs
\'ill serve to avoid repetition. On pages 61 and 62
of defendant's brief defendant makes the ingenious
statement that plaintiffs' 'vitness depreciated the
value of the wa.ter rights of the plaintiffs a specified p~rrPnt of the value thereof. The evidence
does not support such aontention. Plaintiffs' witness g-ave the a.mount of depreciation in the ma.rket
value of the various properties without attempting
to ~eg-regnte t.he depreciation of the wa.ter from
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the land. Indeed, it would he impossible to 1nako
the distinction.
While this record is silent as to whether the water
is or is not appurtenant to the land, the fact remains that in this semi-arid region land without
water is of little or no value. That is a matter of
common knowledge, of which courts will take judicial notice. If the water were taken from the lands
of the plaintiffs it would' result in rendering such
land practically valueless, and especially the homes
built thereon. Nor is any pTactical purpose served
by fixing the dama.ge to the improvements on the
farms of the plaintiffs as distinguished from the
land itself. Indeed, in ·contemplation of law most
of the improvements are a. part of the land. It is
true that as some of the witnesses testified, the
improvements could be removed and used elsewhere. Nor is there any sound legal basis for the
ar.gument that the owners of lands upon which improvements ha.ve not been constructed are not entitled to recover damageR.
One who goes upon his farming lands to work is
entitled to the right to breathe air which is not
polluted with obnoxious odors the same as is one
who spends both day and night upon the land. If
one desires to build a home on his land or sell it,
for someone else to build a home thereon, he may
not lawfully be precluded from so doing. by one
who is maintaining a nuisance which renders his
land unfit for a home. In either event he is entitled to either have The nuisance removed or be
compensated for the damages sustained hy reason
of the wrong, Defendant ha.s ·cited no case or
authority holding to the contrary and we seriously
doubt that one can he found in the hooks where
any such doctrine is announced. The cases in this
jurisdiction heretofore cited are to the contrary.
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It is a cardinal principle of law tha.t one who is
wrongfully injured is entitled to redress. If the
wrong cannot be prevented by injunction the injured p:erson is entitled to money compensation.
This case was, aS' we have heretofore pointed out
in this brief, tried and determined on the theory
that P'laintiffs are entitled to recover the amount
that they are dama.ged by reason o{ the wrongful
acts of the defendant. The n1ea.sure of damages
according to the la'v announced by this Court in
the cases heretofore cited is the depreciation in the
market value of plaintiffs' property caused by tho
wrongful acts of defendant. Indeed, in the absence
of injunctive relief there is no other way of redressing the wrong.
These plaintiffs are farmers. Most of them live
upon their fa.rms. Those who do not may we~l con•
elude to do so were it not for the fact that the nuis·
ance caused and maintained by defendant makes it
impossible to live upon the land in comfort. lf
any of them conclude that they can no longer hear
the stench emanating fro1n defendant's plant they
may, a.s they have a right to do, sell their lands and
the improvements thereon a,t such a price as can
he ohtained, which p·rice by a clear preponderance
of the evidence . 'vill be at a very substantial amount
less than could be secured if defendant were not
rnaint~ini_ng' its nuisance. It is not our contention
tl1at plaintiffs are entitled t.o recover unless the
evidence shows that defendant is guilty of maintaining a. nuisB.nce. vVe concede that i.n the absence
of a showing that defendant has committed a
wrong recognized as such by law, plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover, and hy the same token,
pla.intiffs contend that if a wrong, that is, a nuisance has been, now is and will in all probability he
maintained by the defendant, the plaintiffs are
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entitled to redress. That the defendant havi11g
failed and refused to so use its property as uot to
be a nuisance and insisted on continuing indetiuitely to maintain a nuisance and plaintiffs having
been denied injunctive relief, they are entitled to
redress by the only means open to them, to recover
damages for the injuries sustained, the measure
of which is the depreciation in the market value of
their property occasioned by defendant maintain .
ing the nuisance complained of.
ln this connection it may be noted that there is a
fundamental distinction between a case vvhere in
an action involving a nuisance plaintiffs are denied
injunctive relief because a nuisance has not been
shown by the evidence, and a case where injunctive
relief has been denied because plaintiffs have not
acted timely, or where a court of equity deems an
injunction will needlessly penalize the wrongdoer
without a corresponding. benefit to the complainant,
and where the complainant may he co1npensated
in dama.ges. It may readily be conceded that if a
cause fails because a nuisance has not been shown
damages may not he recovered because in such case
the defendant has done that which he has a legal
right to do. That, however, is not this ca.se. Here
the court found, and under the eiVidence and its
own observation it could not well avoid finding tli.at
a nuisance has been and will be maintained indefinitely. Defendant having succeeded in escaping injunctive relief, not because of its right to do
what has been and will be done, hut in spite of the
fact that it has and will continue to invade plaintiffs' right, must respond by paying such damages
as flow from its wrongful act. That, as we have
heretofore pointed out in this brief, is plaintiffR'
theory and that is the doctrine announced by this
Court in the Kinsman, Thackery, and other cases
heretofore cited.
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\Yith these general observations we shall proceed
to a specific discussion of the evidence as it affects
the Yarious plaintiffs.

DJUIAGES SUSTAINED· BY THOMAS LUDLO~W
~Ir.

P. P. Thomas testified that in his opinion the
home of Thomas Ludlow had a value of $2500.00 in
the absence of the nlaintenance and operation of
defendant's plant; that the other improven1ents
had such a value in the sum of $1156.00 and the
land $8,000.00; tha,t the damage to the home of
~Ir. Ludlow was $500.00, to the improvements
$230.00, to the land $800.00, making a total of
$1530.00. (Tr. 856; Ab. 263).
C. E. Ha,vkins placed the value of the Thomas
Ludlow home at $3500.00, his barn and lean-to at
$500.00 and his land at $200.00 an acre. He gave
it as his opinion that the odor from defendant's
plant depreciated the improven1ents on the Tho1nas
· Ludlow property twenty-five percent, which would
amount to $1,000.00; to the land ten percent.
Thomas Ludlow owned forty acres of land, which
at $200.00 an acre would be $8,000.00, ten p~ercent
of which is $800.00, making a. total of $1800.00
damages to the Thomas Ludlow ·property, according to Mr. Hawkins. (Tr. 949; Ab. 295-6).
Lawrence E. Johnson placed the value
Thomas Ludlow land at $200.06 per acre
depreciation in value ten percent, which
forty acres would amount to $800.00. He
testify about the improvements.

of the
and its
for the
did not

Thotnas 1\f. Anderson placed the app,raised value
of the Thomas E. Ludlow prop,erty with the presPnr(} 0-f defendant's planf ns follows: The home
~:1.000.00; the other improvements $800.00; the
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value of the land $200.00 per acre. He placed tho
depreciation of the home and other improvements
at twenty percent and the depreciation of the land
ten percent, making a total of $1560.00. Thon1as
FJ. Ludlow gave it as his opinion that the· fair rea~
sonable value of his fa.rm and improvements at
this time is $10,000.00. He testified at considerable
1 ength as to the odors at his home, but gave notestimony as to the amount that his property was
depreciated in value on account of defendant's
plant.
The trial court a.warded damag.es to Thomas .ffi.
Ludlo'v in the sum of $1360.

DAMAG-ES SUSTAINED BY EARL LUDLO·V{

P. P. ·Thomas testified that in his opinion the hom0.
of Earl Ludlo'v was of the value of $2,000.00, his
other improvem~nts $800.00, his land $200.00 per
acre, or $4,000.00, making· a total value of $6800
without the defendant's plant; that the da1nage to
the home was $500.00, to the improvements $160,
to the land $400.00, n1aking total damages of
$960.00. C. E. I-Ia,vkins placed the vaue of the
home at $3,000.00, the other improvements $800.00
ll.nd the land of the value of $200.00 per a·cre. Mr.
Hawkins placed the depreciation of the improveJnents at t"\venty-fiv<?- percent and the la.nd at ten
percent, making a.s a total of depreciation on
account of the maintenance of defendant's plant to
the property of Earl T_;udlow. $13'50.00.
Thomas M. Anderson pla,ced the value of the .lDarl
Ludlow home at $3,000, the other improvements at
$600.00 and his land at $200.00 'an acre. He de ..
preciated his home and improvements at twenty
percent of their value, or $900.00, and the land
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$400.00, or a total of $1300.00.

Lawrence E. Johnson placed the value of the land of Earl Ludlo'v at
$200.00 per acre and that the presence of the plant
depreciated it ten percent, or a total of $400.00.
The trial court awarded damag.es in the sum of
$920.00.

D.dMAGE SUSTAINED BY ED\VIN B. SELEN.b}
f'. P. Thomas testified that he placed the value of
the home at $1500.00, the out buildings at $805.00>
the land at $200.00 per acre, or $3538.00, or a total
'yalue of the property without the plant at $5843.00;

that the value of the land and home and improvements with the plant is $2665.00, a total depreciation of $B,179.00. (Ab. 262).
Charles E. Hawkins testified that the value of Mr.
Selene's home without the plant is $2200 · the out'
buildings $800.00, the land $200.00- per acre; that
the plant depreciated the value of the improvements seventy-five percent and the land fifty p·ercent (Ab. 291), thus according to l\fr. Hawkins'
testimony the property "\\71as depreciated b·ecause
of tl1e plant in the sum of $4869.00.
-

Thomas M. Anderson placed the value of the .ffidwin Selene home without the plant at $2,000.00 and
the other improvements at $800.00, and the land
nt $225 per acre. He testified that the improvements on lVf r. Selene's land were depreciated in
value one hundred percent on account of defendant's plant and the land thirty percent. Under
Mr. Anderson's evidence Mr. Selene was damaged
in thP total R11m of $3993.77.
Mr. Sf'lene testified the value of his property was
~7.000 (_,\h. 70) hut did not testify as to the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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preciation in its value on account of defendant's
plant.
La.wrence C. Johnson /placed the value of ~Ir.
Selene's land at $225.00 per acre and that the plant
l1ad depreciated its value one-third, or $1326.42.
He did not testify about the improvements. 'l'he
·court awarded 1\fr. Selc~~e judgment for $2176.00.

DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY
HANS]JN.

P. P.

~lARGARET

D.

r~rhomas

placed the value of the hon1e of Mrs.
Margaret D. Hansen at the sum of $3,000.00 and
the improvements at $800.00 and the la.i1d at
$200.00 per acre, or $5160.00. He placed the depreciation of the home and other improvements by
.reason of defendant's plant, at $760.00 a.nd to tho
land, $516.00 (Ab. 263) or a total of $1276.00.
Charles E. Hawkins placed the value of 1\irs. Ha!lsen 's home at $::5,000.00 and other buildings at
$800.00 and the land at $175.00 per acre He pla.ced
the depreciation on account of the plant on her improvements at twenty pe-rcent and on the land
fifteen percent, ( ~t\b. 294), making a total of
~1437.00.

;rhomas M. Anderson placed the value of Mrs.
Hansen's home at $3,000.00 and other improvements at $800.00 and the land at $200.00 per acre.
He placed the depreciation of the improvements
at thirty percent and the land at fifteen percent
(Ab. 315), making a total depreciation of $1554.00.
La.wrence C. Johnson placed the value of 1\f r~~.
Hansen's land at $225 p·er acre and the depreciation
on account of defendant's plant at twenty per..
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_cent (Ab. 329) making· the damage to the land alone
$1161.
Heber Eug-ene Hanse~ placed the va.l:ue. of the
property at $10,000. The trial court fixed the damage of Mrs. Hansen at $1124.00.
During the course of his testiinony, Eugene Hansen
testified that the home, together . with nineteen
acres and a fraction~ stood in Marga~ret· D.' Hansen's
name and the remaining· 16 acres stood in the name
of his fathe-r,-: Heber J. Hansen, who is dead. Defendant in its --brief at page 51 calls attention to
that testimony and then points out that _the Hansen property was depreciated less than the property of Earl Ludlow which \Vas twice 'as. ra:r a.way
from the plant and about the same as. the, Tho:rpas
E. Ludlow_ property \vhi~h "ras _also nearly. tWice
-It may be th,at the damage
as far from the
to the _Hansen property was . considera'bly greater
~than that fixed- by the court,: because of the fact
that sixteen· acre& of _that ]iroperty stood in thP
-·name of ~eber J. Han~·en, deceased·. ·

plant:

?'I

r- •

It also appears that the prevailing ~wind in the

and

locality of the plant .comes- ftom the east
moves
· towards the west~ that the odors- are conveyed hy
. the wind. The Ludlow properties are west of the
plant. \Vhile thP Han sen proT10rtv is to· 1-he south of
the plant.. If it be contended that !Irs. Hansen
,could not· maintain a.n a.ction for-- damages to th~-\
property which stood in her husband's name~ sueh
contention must fail. Upon the death of Heber
J. Hansen the surviving widow })ecame the owner
in her own right of an und~vided one-third interest
~in the same. She thus had a right to maintain the
-~action even as- to the property standing in the namP
of Heber J. Hansen. ·Moreover; the· uefendant did
·not in the court- below rpiRP tJie qu·estion of the inr.apncity of M ~rg-a-rrf D.- Hansen to maintain' thP
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~1.ction

as to the property which stood in the nan1e
of her deceased husband.
rrhe law is well settled that
''ordinarily defendant waives the objection that plaintiff is not the real party in
interest where he fails to raise it or ia.:ls
to raise it at the proper time, as by den1urrer or answer, and instead of objection on
this ground answers to the merits. Although there is authority to the contrary,
the objection may be waived by conduct indicating express content that the suit proceed.''
46 c. J. 191.
'rhe case of
Cole v. Utah Sugar Company, 35 ·utah 148;
99 P. 681,
supports the view that a defendant claiming that
the cause is not proseeuted by the real party in interest can only be taken advantage of by demurrer
or answer, and if not so taken is waived.
Page 154 of 35 Utah.
The defendant in this case proceeded with the trial
as though ],frs. Hansen were the real and solA
party in interest, without in any way indicating
that it had any objection on that ground. In such
case the defendant waived any objection that it
n1a.y have had to J\1rs. Hansen prosecuting the
action.
Cronk v. Crandall, 121 N. Y. S. 805.
Sandee v. Tschider, 205 Fed. 252.
In any event the evidence supports the judgment.
in favor of Mrs. Hansen without regard to taking
into eonsideration the land that stood in the name
of her husband, Heber J. Hansen, deceased.
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DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY JO·HN ANGUS
P. P. Thomas testified that the home of John Angus
was of the value of $1200.00 if defendant's plant
were not there; his improvements $7 40.00 and his
land $200.00 per acre, or $1564.00; that his home
was damaged $240.00, the other improvements
$150.00 and his land $350.00 (Ab. 2'64), making a
total of $740.00.
Charles E. Ha,vkins testified that the John Angus
home has a value of $1500.00, the other improve·
111ents $750.00, and his land $175.00 per acre, without the damage of defendant's p·lant. That the improvements of Mr. Angus were damaged fifty percent on account of the plant and the land was damaged t'venty p·ercent. Under Mr. Hawkins' testi. .
mony Mr. Angus sustained damages in the total
sum of $1398.70

M. Anderson· placed the value of the home
of John Angus at $1500.00, the other improvements
~rho mas

a.t $750.00 and the land at $175.00 per a.cre. .i:Ie
placed the damage caused by defendant's plant as
being forty percent of the 'improvements and fifteen percent of the land (Ab. 317-18), or a total of

$1205.07.'
La,vrence C. Johnson placed the value of the John
Angus land at $200.00 per a.cre and testified that
in his opinion its ma.rket value was depreciated
twenty percent on account of defendant "s plant.
(Ab. 330). He did not testify a.s to the improve..
ments. The depreciatio·n of the land would thus be
$273.70. The court awarded John Angus damages
in the sum of $824.00.
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D.A.lY.[AGES SUSTAINED BY JOHN

AI~D~RSO.i\

P. P. Thomas testified that except for the injury
-caused by defendant's plant, the J'ohn Anderson
J1nme was of the value of $800.00, the othe1· improvements $250.00, his land $200.00 per acre, making a total of $2050.00; that the damage to the home
and improvements is $800.00; to the land $250.00
(Ab. 262) making total damage of $1060.00.

Charles E. Hawkins placed the value, except for
the injury -caused by defendant's plant, of the
home of John Anderson at $1,000.00, the out building, $300.00 and the land· at $200.00 per acre. Mr.
Hawkins placed the damage to the improvement::;
at seventy-five percent of their value and fifty percent for the land, (Ab. 293) making total damages
of $1475.
Thomas M. Anderson placed the value of the John
Anderson home at $1,000.00, the other improvements $300.00 and the land $225.00 per acre, "rithout the injury caused by defendant's plant. He
testified that the improvements in his opinion were
depreciated one hundred percent and the land
thirty percent (Ab. 313). The total injury thus
would he $1637.50.
The court a'varded John Anderson judgment for
$1050.00.
Defendant seems to -contend that John Anderson
is not entitled to a recovery because the title to
the property stands in his wife's na.me. John
Anderson did testify that the property stood in his
wife's name, but further testified that he owned the
property. The complaint alleges and the answer
admits that John ..Ander~on is the o"\\-Tner of the
property described in the complaint ; see para~ra.ph three of ·defendant's answer (Ab. 2'4).
There was thus no issue as to the o'vnership of thP
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John Anderson prop·erty. Moreover, what we have
heretofore said in this brief about the failure of
defendant to raise any question as to Mrs. Hansen
being the real P'arty in interest applies to John
Anderson. It of course might well he that John
Anderson was the owner of the property even
though it stood in his wife's name.

DAMAGE TO THE PRO·PERTY OF MAYLAN
CARTER.

P. P. Thomas placed the value of the 14.58 acres
of land of Maylan Carter at $200.00 per a.cre, or
a total of $3,096.00. It was his opinion that the
property was damaged in the sum of $619.20 on
account of defendant's plant.
Charles E. Hawkins valued the Maylan Carter
property at $200.00 per acre and that the damage
caused by the plant depreciated the land fifty to
sixty percent. At fifty p~rcent the da.ma.ges would
amount to $1548.
Thomas M. Anderson placed the value of the Ca.rter
property at $225.00 per acre and its. depreciation
on account of the plant at thirty percent (Ab. 314·
15), or a total of $1044.90.
Lawrence C. Johnson pla,ced the value of the Carter
property a.t $225.00 per acre and its deprecia.tion at
thirty.. three and onewothird percent (Ab. 328) or a
total of $1161.00.
}.taylan Carter testified that he paid $225.00 per
acre for his property and in his opinion it was de·
preciated in value on account of defendant's plant
fifty percent, or a total of $1741.50.

The court fixed the dama,ge to the Carter prop . .
o.rty at $646.00,
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Defendant makes some point of the fact that the
trial court dismissed the action as to Maylan
Carter. The actiion, however, as to M.r. Ciarter
was dismissed without prejudice. In its memorandum of decision dated January 6, 1940, the court
states that it permitted the action to be reinstated
as to the plaintiffs 1\llaylan Carter and Edward ~L
Beck, otherwise known as R.eed Beck, the case having been previously dismissed as to said plaintiffs
without prejudice (Tr. 122). So long as the cause
was still before the court, there can be no serious
doubt that the court could change its ruling andreinstate the cause as to Maylan Carter. Indeed, in
the Kinsman ca.se this Court on its own motion indicated that additional parties should be permitted
to join as plaintiffs. It is of course a matter of
common practice, if not indeed the duty, of a trial
court when it believes its ruling is in error to correct the same while the cause is still pending before it. That is what was done by the trial court
in this -cause as to Maylan Carter.

DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY ED\VARD
LOW.

LUD~

P. P. Thomas testified that without defendant's
plant the value of the land of Edward Ludlow is
$225.00 per acre, or $1833.75, and it is damaged
$611.25 by reason of the plant. ( Ab. 263).
Charles E. Ha"\\'kins placed the value of the Edward Ludlow land at $225.00 per acre, and that defendant's plant had depreciated it fifty p~ercent
(Ab. 263), or $916.87.
Thomas M. Anderson plaeed the value of the land
of Edwa.rd Ludlo'v without the plant at $225.00

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47
per acre, or $1833.75, and placed the dep·reciation
at thirty percent, or a total of $550.12.
La,vrence C. Johnson placed the valu~ of the :ffid. .
'va.rd Ludlow land 'vithout the plant at $250.00 per
acre or $2,037.00, and the depreciation on account
of the plant a.t one-third (Ab. 328) or a total of
$u79.16.
The court placed the damage at $427.87.
Defendant attempts to make a point out of the tes ..
timony of Ed,vard Ludlow to the effect that the
record title is not in him. He did so state, but further testified, however, that he held a. deed from
his son that ha.d not been recorded (Ab. 137). It
is of course elementary tha.t the failure to record
a deed can have no bearing on the right of .vJd. .
ward Ludlow to maintain this action.

DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY RUFUS ANDER.
SO-N.
P. P. Thomas placed the value of the Rufus An. .
derson home 'vithout the plant at $2250.00, the out
buildings $1,000.00; the land $2'50.00 per acre for
19.53 acres, or $4875; and that the total value of Mr .
. A.nderson 's p~roperty if the plant were not t_here
would be $8,132.00; with the p·lant there $5157.00,
or a total damage to the land of $975.00 and to
the improvements $2,000, making a total of $2975.00.

Charles E. Ha,vkins testified that without defend..
ant's vlant the Rufus Anderson home is worth
$3225.00 rl,nd the other improvements $750; and the
land $225.00 per acre; that the home and improveSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ments are depreciated seventy-five percent and the
land fifty percent, making a total of $4607.97.
T~omas M. Anderson placed the value of the Rufus
Anderson home at $2300, the improvements at
$750.00 and the land a.t $250.00 per acre, if the
plant were not there. He testified that the improvements were reduced one hundred percent and
the land about thirty percent, making· a total deduction of $5487.50.

La.wrence E. Johnson placed the value of the Rufus
Anderson prop~erty at $2.50.00 per acre and that it.
was reduced ih value one-third, or $1628.33. Mr.
Johnson did not testify concerning the improvements.
The court awarded damages in the sum of $2099.30.
It appears that Mr. Anderson remodeled his home
in 1935 at a cost of about $1400.00 (Ab. 12'0). This
\vas the year when the cookers were placed in defendant's plant. Apparently defendant contends
that in a.ny event Mr. Anderson should not be
allowed any depreciation to the additional value
which he expended in remodeling his home. In
other words, as we understand defendant, it takes
the positio~ that Mr. Anderson was not permitted
to assume that when defendant began cooking the
dead carcasses and offal which it collected from
various counties, Mr. Anderson wa.s chargeable with
foreseeing that the defendant would continue indefinitely to so operate its plant; that it would be
impossible to live in his home without continuing
to breathe the noxious odors from the plant. It is
submitted that ~Ir. Anderson had a right to remodel his home and that defendant may not be
1heard to complain if it is required to compensate
him for the vvrongs complained of.
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DAJ\1.A.GE SUSTAINED B-Y PAUL E.

SWART~

P. P. Thomas placed the value of the Swartz home,
w·ithout any depreciation caused by defendant's
plant, at $3.000.00, the out buildings at $2,000.00.
and the land consisting of 2'9.18 acres at $200.00
per acre. or $5835.00. He placed the depreciation
of the home at $600.00, the out buildings at $400.00
and the land at $583.00, on account of defendant's
plant, making a total of $1583.00.
Charles E. Ha"'. .kins placed the value of the Swartz
l1ome at $3000, the outbuildings $3150 and the
value of the land at $200.00 per acre. He testified
the Swartz farm was dep~reciated in value twentyfive percent and the land twenty percent Oll
account of defendant's plant. The total depreciation of the Svvartz property according to Mr
Hawkin~ therefore is $1917.20
Lawrence C. Johnson valued the Swartz land at
$200.00 per acre and placed its depreciation 1n
value at twenty percent, or a total of $1167.00.
The court fixed the amount of the damage tn the
Swartz property at $1230.00.
It will be noted that in every instance except one
the trial court fixed the amount of damages substantially below the lowest figures given by any of
plaintiffs' witnesses. The one exception \Vas that
of the depreciation in the value of the John Anderson property, in which case the court placed the
damage at the sam8 amount as did the wit.ness

P. P. Thomas
The defendant ·called three witnesses, T. H. Heal
of Provo, Wm. Parry of Springville, and Henry
Jeppson, a contractor who resides at Payson. Heal
and Plarry are engaged in the real estate hu~iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ness. These witnesses collaborated as to the
of plaintiffs' property.

valiH-~

Charles S. Woodward, from Salt Lake City, who :s
engaged in the real estate business, also testified
on behalf of the defendant. Mr. Woodward had
been in Chicago and Kansas City and evidently
had heard about the stock yards in those cities and
had some notion about the effect of the stock yards
upon real estate values. Just what bearing that
has upon the question here presented is hard to
determine. These witnesses) while admitting that
obnoxious odors emanated from defendant's plant,
testified that the market value of plaintiffs' prop~
erty was not depreciated in value because of such
odors. They all placed the value of the property
belonging to plaintiffs somcnvhat lo\ver than that
placed upon the property by plaintiffs' witnesses.
Plaintiffs' witnesses all lived within a few miles of
the property in question and it appears from the
testimony that they were familiar with such property and ~rith the odors that emanated from defendant's plant. P. P. Thomas resided at Spanish
Fork. He is connected with the Bank of Spanish
Fork, one at Nephi, and the one at Heber City. He
iR familiar 'vith the lands in question and at one
time owned one of the tracts of land. He had
appraised and made loans on other tracts and had
frequently experienced thP. odors coming from the
plant. Charles E. Hawkins resided· at Benjamin
and had been County Assessor of Utah County for
ten years and also a.ctea as appraiser for the Deseret Savings Bank. Thomas M. Anderson resided
at Lake Shore, about three and one-half mileR from
the land in question. He wa.s an employee of the
Spanish Fork Loan Association and had been employed by the Federal Land Bank to appra.iRe property in the vicinity of plaintiffs' property.
Lawrence C. Johnson resides at Benjamin about
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three-fourths of a n1ile "Tt'st and 40 rods south of
deft~ndant 's plant. He was a farmer by occupation
and had experience in appraising lands in the
vicinity of plaintiffs' lands. AU of the plaintiffs'
'vitnesses had first hand infonnation on the nature
and extent of the odors emanating from defendant's plant since its erection.
We have heretofore in this brief given a, short
summary of the evidence touching the nature and
extent of the odors coming from defendant's plant
and shall not enlarge upon what we ha:ve said. but
again urge the Court, if it has the 1.ime, to read
the transcript. 'Ve also again call the attention of
the Court to the fact that the judge 'vho tried thE:
cause visited the plant and was invited to visit it.
as often as he desired, but it does not a.ppea1·
'vhether he visited the plant and its vicinity mor(J
than once. Ho"\\~ever this (~ourt judiciallv
kno-vv~
._,
that Judge Hoyt resides at Nephi and is the judge
of the Fifth Judicial District Court of this State.
The evidence ~ho"rs that one of the main travelled
paved highways from points south of the plant to
points north thereof passes near the plant and it
is a fair assumption that Judge Hoyt ha~ passed
along that highway in coming- from his district t0
points north of the plant. It· is not unrea~onable
to assuine that he 'vas familiar 'vith defendant's
plant or that upon the invitation of defendant he
hecame familiar therewith before l1e n1ade his findings of fact, conclusions of law 2nd judgment.
}\_ hypothetical question that might properly be
asked of an expert witness as to the effect, if any.
on the market value of th P property of plaintiffs by
the operation and maintenancP of defendant's
rlant (for the purpose of illustration Mr. Edward
RPlPn~ '~ prouertv) "'·'·onld he sjmila.r to this:
_;\ssnming, l\f r. vVitnPss. thnt a person is the owner
of ] 7.69 acres of irri.rrated farm land of the value
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52

of $200.00 per acre, with a home thereon of the
value of $1500.00 and outbuildings of the value of
$805.00, and, at a distance of about thirty rods south
of the home a rendering plant is constructed of
cement and brick with an open sump into which
blood and manure from dead animals drains and is
permitted to stand until it seeps away or evaporates, and the carcasses of some fifty to seventyfive horses and cows, which have been dead one o1·
two days, are collected at the plant per month, and
in addition to the carcasses of cows and horses,
dead pigs, sheep, offal. and bones are collected at
such plant and cooked for the purpose of manufacturing bone meal, fertilizers, poultry feed and
tallow; and assuming there is also collected and
stored at the plant from one to several tons of
bones in which rats make their nest, and assuming
'that the odor from the cooking of the dead an1mals
draws flies in great numbers to the plant and such
home, and assuming that odors emanate from the
;plant intermittently every day and frequently at
nights, and such odors smell like rotten meat; and
assuming that such odors sometimes continue for
1a.n hour and other times almost continuously and
are so intense at times that it sickens the entire
fa.mily and keep~s them awake all night and the
children cry because of the odors~ and assun1ing at
times these odors ·Continue all day and night and
'jn the summer time the smell is stronger than in the
winter; and assuming that when the odors come
at meal times the people living in the home are unable to eat, and not infrequently the smell causes
them to vomit; and assuming that such odorR at
times burn your throat and are SO thick that it iA
difficult to breathe the air and the air chokes you
a.nd is so strong that you can almost chew the sb~ff:
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and assuming that the smell is so strong at times
that horses become frightened and it is difficult to
control them; and assuming that the odors emanating from the plant bring swarins of blow flies to
the house; and assuming that when one's clothes
have been exposed to the odor, the smell remains
in such clothes for hours thereafter, and assuming
that these odors are not improving, notwithstand~ng the owner of the plant claims that he has done
all he can to do a\vay with the odors, and assuming
ihat the O\vner of the plant cannot be enjoined
from continuing the op,eration of the plant, and
assuming that the plant is so constructed as to in-dicate it will be operated permanently or for an indefinite time; under these facts, 1vlr. Expert Witness, have you an opinion as to whether or not the
maintenance and operation of such a· plant will
affect the market value of the land and home above
mentioned' If the answer is yes, then this question might follow: Will the operation and maintenance of such a plant, under such circumstances,
enhance or diminish the value of such a home and
farm so located, and, if so, how much?
Similar hypothetical questions might properly be
~sked as to the homes and farm lands of the other
plaintiffs.
Defendant's witnesses would have us believe that
1hP property here brought in question would not
he depreciated in value under such circu1nstances,
and at least one of them \Vould seem to be of the
opinion that the homes and farms might be enhanced in value because notwithstanding only about
t'vo men are ·employed at the plant, the operation
of ~nch a nlant migl1t create an industrial a.rea. W c
pa11~0 to observe that it is not likely that an indus·
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trial plant will seek a lo·cation where it is inlpossible to live in comfort.
Plaintiffs' witnesses testified tha.t these facts result in a substantial dep-reciation in the market
value of the p·roperty and gave the amount of such
depreciation. Defendant 'vould have this Court
answer the question as did defendant's witnesses.
notwithstanding the trial court 'vho saw the "'~it
nesses, heard them testify and who examined the
plant, believed that in the main plaintiffs' witnesses
spoke the 'truth. It is submitted that the trial cour~
was right when he believed plaintiffs and their
witnesses. But as we understand d~~endant it
contends that even though plaintiffs are entitled to
recover some damages, the award of the trial court
is so large a.s to show that' the dam.ag:es were awarded a.s result of bias or prejudice on the part of the
finder of the facts. Attention is again called to the
fact that the trial judge substantially reduced the
amount of the awards that were fixed by plaintiffs'
witnesses.
If the odors emanating from defendant's plant and
entering the homes and outbuildings of these
plaintiffs who live near the plant are of sucn char:Jcter, intensity and frequency as shown by the evi··
dence, it is not difficult to understand why M.r
Anderson placed the damage to the improvements
on some of the homes at one hundred percent and
Mr. Hawkins placed such damag-e as hjgh as seventYfive percent. Is it not more likely that one who had
~ufficient funds to purchase a farm and a. home
'vould not be interested at all in the purchase of
such a home, or would not be 'villing to pay anything like a normal value for a farm so situated
and so infested with odors, rats. and flies~ Not in-
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frequently attractive scenery very materially adds
to the value of a home or a farm, and it is but reasonable to believe that the presence or absence of
pure air is of vital concern to one who would pur-·
chase a home or a farm. l\1en and 'vomen do not
live by bread alone. They deman_d and a.re willing
to pay more for property where they can enjoy the
comforts of life. They may not lawfully be deprived of pure air and be rendered miserable by a
plant such as that which the evidence shows has
been, is and, as defendant insists, will be permanently maintained and operated, 'vithout regard
to the discomfort or injury that it causes these
plaintiffs.
··
::·1
We submit that the judgment should be affirmed
with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
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